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This paper reviews current trade–related regulations of genetically modified (GM) food 
and discusses their effects on developing countries. There is a large heterogeneity in current 
import approval and marketing policies of GM food worldwide. At the international level, the 
harmonization efforts are led by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety and the World Trade Organization. While internationally harmonized guidelines for 
safety approval have been finalized, we show that there is no clear consensus on labeling 
regulations for GM food, and there is an increasing risk of conflicts among international 
agreements.  We analyze the GM food regulations of two large rich importers, Japan and the 
European Union (EU) and discuss their differences and their potential impact on international 
trade. We also show that the effects of international and domestic trade related regulations 
critically depend on the type of traded products and their intended use: food and unprocessed 
products are subject to more stringent regulations than animal feed and processed products. 
Finally, we identify the main spillover effects of national and international regulations on 
developing countries’ policy making, and suggest four policy arrangements on GM food to 
enable developing countries to satisfy production, consumption, international trade, and risk 
management objectives simultaneously while complying with their international obligations. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Ten years after its first products, agricultural biotechnology has allowed significant 
agronomic improvements of some of the major field crops traded internationally (soybeans, 
cotton, maize and canola). In 2005, transgenic crops, also called genetically modified (GM) 
crops, were grown in seventeen countries by an estimated 8.5 million farmers on a total acreage 
of 90 million hectares (James 2005).  The fact that so many farmers are now planting GM crops 
and that the total area in these crops is increasing annually (e.g. 11 percent increase in area 
between 2004 and 2005) is an evidence of the commercial success of this production technology.           
However, there are only four GM crops widely produced, and these four crops are mostly 
used for animal feed or non-food uses,
1 whereas no major transgenic “food” crop has been 
released yet.
2  If the number of GM “food” crops in the regulatory pipeline of many countries has 
been steadily increasing in the last five years, ranging from fruits and vegetables to major field 
crops such as wheat and rice, only a few transgenic “food” crops were officially approved and 
produced at a small scale (GM papaya and sweet corn in the United States, GM white maize in 
South Africa, and GM rice in Iran).
3  In addition, only five large countries represent the 
overwhelming majority of GM crop acreage (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China and the United 
                                                           
1 Approximately 65 percent of maize and 71 percent of soybean supply is used for animal feed; cotton is mostly 
used for textile and cottonseed is mostly used for animals.  
2 The quotes for “food” put the emphasis on the fact that these crops are mostly used for human consumption. In 
contrast, in the article, we will use the generic term GM food without quotes for raw and processed products derived 
from GM crops and used for food and/or animal feed.  





States represent over 96 percent of GM crop acreage). These limitations reflect the other side of 
the economics of GM crops; the demand side and the effects of GM food regulations.  
Due to consumer, environmental, ethical or political reasons, many countries have 
adopted stringent regulation regarding the approval and the marketing of food and feed products 
derived from GM crops. Some of these regulations (such as labeling requirements or import 
approval), associated with the relative lack of demand in rich importing countries for GM 
products have offset the economic productivity gains of GM food crops to the point of making 
them potentially unprofitable for developers, large producers and exporters of these crops. In 
particular, GM wheat was developed in the United States, but was shelved by the Monsanto in 
2004 before commercialization, partially because it lacked the full approval of producer 
associations from U.S. and Canada who reportedly feared to lose export markets (Berwald, 
Carter, and Gruere forthcoming). 
In fact, international regulations of GM food vary widely among developed countries. In 
particular, the European Union and the United States have adopted different approaches on the 
marketing of genetically modified food. The EU regulations follow an approach based on the 
“precautionary principle” and consumers’ “right to know,” with stringent approval, labeling and 
traceability standards on any food produced from or derived from GM ingredients. In contrast, 
the U.S. regulation approach is based on differences in the end product, and includes a voluntary 
safety consultation and voluntary labeling guidelines for GM food.4
5 Most other developed 
countries, including Japan, Canada, or Australia have introduced intermediary regulations 
between these two (Carter and Gruère forthcoming).  
                                                           
4 However, the voluntary safety consultation de facto Acts as a mandatory safety approval because all four comply 
with it (See Section 2). 
5 Regarding labelling, non-substantially equivalent GM foods have to display the difference with conventional 





 In the developing world, some of the large agricultural traders (such as Brazil) have 
developed biosafety and marketing regulations on GM food, but at the same time many other 
developing countries have not adopted any specific regulation of GM food because they lack the 
capacity to do so, or perhaps they have adopted a position of wait and see. One of the reasons 
advanced by these latter countries is that the introduction of any GM crop and the 
implementation of any particular regulations may have a direct effect on their current and future 
agricultural exports to countries with stringent regulations (Zarrilli 2005). With the increasing 
globalization of agriculture, some of them prefer to observe policies implemented in other 
countries and the development of international harmonized regulations before deciding what set 
of regulation they should adopt. 
At the international level, two main institutions have worked in an effort to provide 
harmonized regulations on agricultural biotechnology: the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 
which is part of the United Nations (UN) Convention on Biodiversity, and the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, under the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the 
World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, discussions over the regulation of agricultural 
biotechnology has arisen at the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the United States, 
Argentina and Canada launched a trade dispute against the alleged EU moratorium on approval 
of new GM crops in 2003. U.S. observers believe that another trade dispute may follow on the 
strict traceability and labeling requirements replacing the moratorium in the EU since April 
2004.  
  The objectives of this paper are first to analyze current trade related national and 
international approval and marketing regulations of GM food, and second to identify the effects 





trade related regulations of GM food. We deliberately exclude biosafety regulations concerning 
the planting and environmental release of GM crops except if they are likely to affect 
international trade. We define GM food as raw and processed products derived from GM crops 
and used for food and/or animal feed. These products represent an average trade value of $42 
billion/year.
6 Since there is no trade related regulations on non-food or non-feed products from 
GM crops (e.g, cotton fibers derived from GM cotton, or ornamental GM plants), regulations 
considered in this article do not apply to them.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we offer a general overview of 
current approval and food labeling policies worldwide. In the third section, we present current 
and pending regulations of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety and at the WTO. In the fourth section, we review the regulations of two large 
importing regions (the European Union and Japan) and we discuss the effects of these 
regulations on international trade. In the fifth section, we classify all the reviewed trade related 
regulations according to the type of products they affect: raw versus processed GM products and 
those affecting products used for food versus animal feed. In the sixth section, we identify the 
main effects of international regulations on developing countries, and draw lessons from our 
review of regulations to analyze what should be done to find adequate policy response for 
developing countries under these constraints. We conclude this paper by drawing policy lessons 
and identifying future areas of research.  
                                                           





2.  OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL TRADE RELATED REGULATIONS OF GM FOOD 
Trade related regulations of GM food include import approval measures and marketing 
regulations. More specifically, unlike in the case of conventional commodities, exported GM 
food is subject to specific import approval procedures or complete bans in many countries, 
labeling requirements in an increasing number of countries, and traceability requirements in a 
few countries. Import approval is a direct measure affecting market access, whereas labeling and 
traceability indirectly affects trade through the imposition of the cost of implementation for 
exporters of GM crops. In addition, marketing regulations can affect the demand for GM versus 
non-GM crops; for example, GM food labels can act as perceived hazard warnings and reduce 
demand for these crops despite their approval from food safety authorities.  
In 2005, ten years after the introduction of the first GM crop, there is large heterogeneity 
across nations in the regulations of GM food. At a macro level, countries can be divided into 
three groups according to the status or type of their regulations (Zarrilli 2005): first, countries 
with a comprehensive and stringent regulatory framework applied to GM food, including 
mandatory safety approval and mandatory labeling; secondly, countries that have adopted a more 
pragmatic regulatory approach based on the notion of substantial equivalence with voluntary 
labeling instead of mandatory labeling for GM food; and third a large number of countries either 
without regulations or pending towards adopting certain regulations on GM food approval and 
marketing. Currently, developed countries are in the first and second group, while most 
developing countries are in the third group, with a few notable exceptions. The distinction 
between voluntary and mandatory labeling is important, because it drives a number of necessary 
regulatory requirements. Mandatory labeling requirement affects the whole agro-food channel 





presence or origin for each food product, whereas voluntary labeling is driven by private 
incentives and the presence of market niches for non-GM food.
7  
Even within these groups, the regulatory process from approval to commercialization 
varies widely across individual countries. Figure 1 presents a schematic decision tree of countries 
according to their approval and marketing regulations.  
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At the first level of division, countries may or may not have adopted any type of approval 
or marketing regulation on GM food. Then among the ones with regulations, there are two main 
groups of countries, the ones that rely on a test of substantial equivalence (substantial equivalent 
products are exempt from specific requirements) and the other who generally do not and whose 
                                                           
7 For more information on an economic comparison between voluntary and mandatory labeling, see Runge and 





regulatory procedure depends on the production process (which means that any food produced 
with or derived from transgenic crop is subject to GM food regulations). Each country has also 
adopted its set of safety approval and labeling policies with specific characteristics. As shown in 
Section 4, the specificities of the labeling regulation largely determine the observable effects of 
regulations on international trade. More stringent regulations will generally require more costly 
procedures on behalf of exporters and more comprehensive policies may have a more important 
trade effect. On the other hand, countries with no specific regulations include those that are about 
to adopt approval or marketing regulations, the ones with no clear regulations, and the ones that 
have declared themselves GM free. A subdivision in Figure 1 separates countries that are in the 
process of introducing regulations from the ones about to implement regulations of GM food.  
At the end of the division tree in Figure 1, countries can be divided into eight categories 
or groups (defined by their eight terminal boxes) according to their regulatory framework.  Table 
1 presents example of countries in each of these eight groups. OECD countries are represented in 
the first four categories (except Mexico and Turkey), and several countries with transition 






Table 1--Characteristics of group and examples of countries in each group 











EU, East Europe 




low threshold  
Brazil, China, Russia, 
Switzerland, Norway 
Group 3  Process based mandatory  “Pragmatic” mandatory  Many labeling 
exceptions 
Australia, Japan, Korea, 
Saudi Arabia, Thailand  
Group 4  Substantial equivalence, 






level for labeling 
US, Canada, Argentina, 
South Africa, Taiwan 
Group 5  Mandatory  (in place or 
pending) 
Mandatory, introduced 







Group 6  Mandatory  (in place or 
pending) 





Group 7  Considering mandatory  No clear position  Wait and see 
approach 
Bangladesh, most African 
countries 
Group 8  No  No  GM free  A few African countries 
(Zimbabwe, Zambia) 
 
All these countries have adopted specific regulatory framework for GM food and other 
products derived from GM crops. In contrast, most developing countries are currently in groups 
5 to 8, because they are either without or in the process of adopting specific trade related 
regulations of GM food.  
The large producers and exporters of GM crops have well defined regulations, but most 
of them are in Group 4 (Canada, United States, Argentina, South Africa), with pragmatic 
regulations of GM food, while the last two are in Group 2 (Brazil and China), with stringent 





stringent regulations. More specifically, Table 1 shows the level of stringency differentiating 
national regulations or approaches. Most groups of countries have adopted, are about to adopt or 
intend to adopt mandatory safety approval regulations of GM food. The United States is a 
particular case; it has a voluntary safety consultation that is de facto considered a mandatory 
requirement, because all companies comply with it for liability reasons. But different groups 
have distinctive approaches on labeling of GM food. As argued in the following section, this 
reflects the level of success of international harmonization efforts: international convergence on 
specific requirements for safety approval and important divergences among countries with 
regulations on labeling and traceability of GM food. 
To sum up, this overview of national regulations reveals that there is a large 
heterogeneity in regulations among countries, first in terms of development stages of regulatory 
framework, and second between countries with well defined regulations. Developed countries 
differ in their general approach of regulations, with most GM producers and exporters in groups 
of pragmatic regulations while importers tend to have more stringent marketing regulations for 
GM food and GM derived products. Developing countries tend to have fewer regulations in 
place. We will now review the major international efforts to harmonize policies on approval and 
labeling regulations of GM food. 
 
 
3.   INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION EFFORTS  
There are six international organizations directly or indirectly involved in setting up 
harmonized rules, standards and recommendation related to international trade in GM crops 





Table 2--International institutions involved in the regulation of international trade of GM 
crops and GM food 
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regulations for animal 
and animal products 
GATT/WTO 
(1947/1994) 
Trade in goods and most 
services 






Pests and pathogens of 






standards for plant  
OECD (1961)  Harmonization of 
international regulations, 
standards and policies 

















movements of GM 
organisms 
120 None  Information  sharing 
and biosafety measures 
Source: Smyth et al. (2004) page 80, and institutions’ websites. 
 
 
Among these six institutions, three only have an indirect role in the regulation of the products of 
agricultural biotechnology. The International Office of Epizootics and the International Plant 
Protection Convention are based on multilateral treaties that provide standards on the movement 
of animal and plant pathogens, respectively.  Even if they have standards that may apply to living 
modified organisms,
8 they do not have specific rules on GM food. These institutions may affect 
international trade because their standards are recognized as reference standards by the Sanitary 
                                                           
8 In particular the IPPC has a particular standard (ISPM 11) providing guidance on risk assessment for living 





and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement of the WTO.  If a country follows an IPPC or IOE standard 
it is presumed to be in compliance and not adopt other standards. Countries can use other 
standards but under SPS rules they have to make a case for their standard on the basis of risk. 
The third organization is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
The OECD develops documents, guidelines and recommendations on harmonized rules, policies 
and standards on agricultural biotechnology for its members. Because the EU and the United 
States are members of the OECD, any recommendation on how to regulate biotechnology 
approved in this forum may influence future international decisions in other institutions. 
The three other institutions, namely the Codex Alimentarius, the Biosafety Protocol and 
the WTO are directly involved in trade related issues and the regulations of the products of 
agricultural biotechnology. We will present their specific harmonization efforts in the next three 
sections. 
UN FAO/WHO CODEX ALIMENTARIUS 
The Codex Alimentarius is an inter-governmental organization managed jointly by the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization. The 
Codex has two main purposes 1) to protect the health of consumers and 2) to promote fair 
practices in international trade (Kimbrell 2000). The Codex provides international 
recommendations and standards based on a consensus among members. The Codex standards 
and recommendations are important for international traders, because they are recognized as 
reference standards of food safety in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World 
Trade Organization. 
The Codex Commission has been working on finding a common terminology, a common 





beginning of the 1990s. The Codex Commission has published guidelines for the safety 
assessment of GM food, but it failed thus far to reach any agreement on the issue of GM food 
labeling.  
On questions related to food safety, the Codex Commission reached an official 
agreement, which resulted in the publication of the following three documents in 2003:
9 
•  Principles for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern Biotechnology: This 
document lays up a framework of analysis, with the following steps: 
y  Risk assessment: it should be based on a comparison of the new food with the 
conventional food;  
y  Risk management: it should take into account the level of risk and the uncertainty 
associated with it, and may include labeling and post-market monitoring;  
y  Risk communication: it is necessary to assure the transparency in the system; 
y  Consistency: the risk analysis for these particular products should be consistent with 
other risk analysis; 
y  Capacity Building and Information Exchange: this part underlines the necessity for 
the parties to help developing countries to build a regulatory capacity, and should be 
encourages to share information 
y  Review Process: the risk analysis should be reviewed after a certain period to 
account for new scientific knowledge and technologies. 
 
                                                           





•  Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods Derived from 
Recombinant-DNA Plants: This document proposes a framework for food safety 
assessment, largely based on the principle of establishing substantial equivalence 
between the GM product and its conventional counterpart. It recommends to proceed 
with the following steps: 
y  Description of the recombinant-DNA plant; 
y  Description of the host plant and its use as food; 
y  Description of the donor organism(s); 
y  Description of the genetic modification(s); 
y  Characterization of the genetic modification(s); 
y  Safety assessment: 
o  expressed substances (non-nucleic acid substances); 
o  compositional analyses of key components; 
o  evaluation of metabolites; 
o  food processing; 
o  nutritional modifications; and 
o  other considerations. 
 
•  Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods Produced Using 
Recombinant-DNA Microorganisms: This document proposes a framework for the safety 
assessment of GM organisms following the same general scheme as the guideline for GM 
food. It adds two steps to the safety assessment: first an assessment of viability and 
residence of microorganisms in the human gastrointestinal tract, and secondly an 





The international consensus on risk assessment of safety of GM food reflects the 
similarities between existing approval procedures across major trading countries. In particular, 
the mandatory safety assessment in the European Union, Japan, Korea, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand and the voluntary safety assessment guidelines of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration all prescribe to follow a framework based on these different steps. The main 
differences of approval procedures among these developed countries appear at the risk 
management level. 
10 
In contrast, on the labeling of GM food, there is no agreement within the Codex and the 
effort of the Session on Food Labeling seems to be stopped. No formal standard has been 
adopted on labeling. There are 8 steps to follow in the setting of Codex standards (MacKenzie 
2000), from the decision to elaborate a standard (Step 1) to the point were the draft standard is 
adopted by the Codex Alimentarius Commission and sent to governments for final acceptance 
(Step 8). After eleven years of discussions within the Codex Committee on Food Labeling, the 
draft guideline on the labeling of GM food remains at Step 3: the proposed draft standard is sent 
again to international organization and governments for comments. 
 In 2004, at the 32
nd Session of the Codex Committee on Food Labeling, only the 
amendment Definition of Terms of the General Standard for the Labeling of Prepackaged Foods, 
which is directly related to the labeling guidelines, was advanced to Step 7 of the Procedure. But 
the actual “Proposed Draft Guidelines for the Labeling of Food and Food Ingredients Obtained 
through Certain Techniques of Genetic Modifications/Genetic Engineering” remained at Step 3 
of the Procedure in 2005. 
                                                           
10 We detail the specific steps for the EU and Japan in Section 4. For more detail on the other countries’ procedure, 





 The labeling provisions of the draft guidelines (section 3) include the following 
recommendations: 
3.1.   Labeling should be required to GM food that is not substantially equivalent; 
3.2.   Labeling should be required for GM food that contain allergens; 
3.3.    Labeling should be required for substances with physiological or metabolic 
impacts; 
3.4.  Where label indicate the presence of production process, GM food (food 
containing GM and food with ingredients derived from GM food) should be 
labeled; 
3.5.  For GM food products for which there are religious or dietary concerns, labeling 
should be required.  
The three first provisions (3.1, 3.2 and 3.3) are supported by virtually all active members 
of the Codex Commission. They recommend labeling requirements for GM food with significant 
changes in product characteristics. In contrast, article 3.4. is the object of a large disagreement 
among Codex members. This article recommends the use of labeling based on differences in 
production methods; under this article, all GM food should be labeled, whether or not there is 
any detectable GM ingredient in the final product.  
The United States, Canada, and others are opposed to this latter recommendation, 
because they consider that it has no information related to food safety (since all commercialized 
GM food would have passed the safety assessment), which means that it has no place in the 
Codex Alimentarius, and that such labeling products under this rule may act as a warning effect 
on consumers. While others, including, the EU, Switzerland, Brazil, India, and Cameroon 
support this clause, because they see it as a response to a strong demand for information from 





information, and they refer to other work of the Codex Committee on Food Labeling on the 
issues of country-of-origin labeling and organic food labeling. 
The draft guidelines also include a provisional section on the necessity to set up a 
threshold level for adventitious presence of GM food, and a section on exemptions for labeling 
provisions 3.4 and 3.5, letting countries decide whether or not to require labeling on certain 
specific GM food products (such as oils and other highly processed products). The sixth section 
provides recommendations on text declarations for labeling based on product characteristics (i.e., 
under provisions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) and labeling based on the method of production (under 
provisions 3.4 and 3.5). The last section proposes to consider rules of implementation and 
enforcement (such as testing standards and traceability). 
During the 32
nd Session of the Codex Committee on Food Labeling in 2004, countries did 
not reach any type of agreement, and failed to make progress on the labeling guidelines. Some 
countries (such as Canada) said they would like to split the text of the guidelines into two parts, 
one with labeling provisions related to changes in the product and health and safety related 
labeling (sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) and the other with labeling based on methods of production 
(sections 3.4 and 3.5). They argue that the first part would quickly advance in the Codex 
approval Procedure, because there appears to be a consensus on this issue. But other countries 
(such as the EU and the United States) would prefer to keep the text together. In addition, there 
was no consensus on setting up a new taskforce to help advance in the labeling issues.  
During the 33
rd Session, in May 2005 in Malaysia, the Codex Committee on Food 
Labeling discussed GM food labeling during a whole day. Once again, there was no simple 
consensus, but this time two clear groups of countries were identified. A group of thirty countries 





Zealand, Tunisia, Senegal, Swaziland, Panama, Turkey and Ghana) showed support for a 
standard including extensive labeling requirements for GM food and based on the adoption of 
sections 3.4, and 3.5 of the proposed guidelines. In a second group, seven countries (the United 
States, Mexico, Argentina, Thailand, Australia, and the Philippines) were in favor of the 
adoption of sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 – related to GM products with substantial differences- and 
clearly opposed to the other two sections of the proposed guidelines. Given the significant 
difference between these two groups, the Chair of the Committee decided to form a Working 
Group whose task will be to “reconstitute” the proposed guidelines. In the current state of debate, 
this effort should help to separate clauses that gather support from the overwhelming majority of 
countries –those that require labeling on products that are not substantially equivalent- and that 
could be adopted easily, from clauses that remain contested- those that require the labeling of 
GM food products and products derived from GM ingredients- and that could be first accepted 
on a voluntary basis (BRIDGES 2005). 
 
UN CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was introduced in January 2000 as part of the 
United Nation Convention on Biodiversity in an effort to set up a harmonized framework of risk 
assessment, risk management and information sharing on the transboundary movements of 
Living Modified Organisms (LMOs). The Protocol entered into force on 11 September 2003, 
ninety days after receipt of the 50th instrument of ratification, but the Parties still have to decide 
a number of specific rules to implement it. GM organisms, GM seeds, and raw products from 
GM crops (used for food or feed) are considered LMOs. As shown in Table 3, unprocessed food 





import value), at a total of about $26 billion/year, in comparison with $16 billion for processed 
products.  
Table 3--Five-year average (2000-2004) world import value of raw versus processed 
products for major GM commodities 
Total import value 
($ million) 
Maize Soybeans Rapeseed Cottonseed Total four crops 
Unprocessed (raw)  9,932 13,091  2,516  235  25,789 
Processed  1,290 12,879  1,989  131  16,358 
Share of unprocessed  87.9% 50.4%  55.8%  55.9%  61.2% 
Source: Author’s derivations, derived from UN Comtrader data base (HS 1996 classification).  
 
In detail, the share of total trade value varies by crop; a very large share of maize is exported 
unprocessed, whereas roughly half of the soybean trade value comes from processed products 
(mainly soybean oil and soybean oil cake). In addition, the overall share of unprocessed food for 
these crops remained approximately constant between 2000 and 2004 (between 60.7 and 63 
percent). 
The key elements of the Biosafety Protocol (BSP) are the following (Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 2000). First, the BSP introduces an Advanced Informed 
Agreement (AIA) procedure between exporters and the importers of LMOs for intentional 
introduction into the environment (Art. 7). This procedure requires the exporter to provide an 
application with a comprehensive risk assessment and risk management file before the first entry 
of any particular LMO. In addition the BSP initiates a harmonized information sharing 
mechanism, the Biosafety Clearing-House, where all risk assessments and information should be 
reported.  The BSP provides rules related to the bundling, transport, packaging and identification 
for any transboundary movement of LMOs (Article 18). The BSP also institutes a financial 
mechanism to provide support for the parties that cannot afford its implementation (Art. 22). 






In the context of international trade, Article 18 of the BSP allows importers of LMOs 
intended to be released in the environment to request information regarding specific GM content 
and varieties to the exporters, and obliges the exporters to conduct a risk assessment on any new 
GM crop. In addition, BSP parties may decide to ban imports of one or more GM crop variety as 
a precautionary measure. The BSP follows a precautionary approach, consistently with the 
Convention on Biodiversity, and was supported by the EU and other countries as what they 
consider a necessary procedure to protect human health and the environment from GM crops 
with unknown or non-quantified long term risks.   
There are specific rules for LMOs intended for direct uses as feed, food or processing 
(noted LMO-FFPs). This group of LMOs represents about 90 percent of all movements of LMOs 
(Kalaitzandonakes 2004). Article 11 and Article 18.2.a. of the BSP provide the main set of rules 
for LMO-FFPs. These particular LMOs are not subject to the full biosafety assessment of Article 
18 because they are not intended to be released in the environment. Article 11 suggests that 
importers use domestic regulations that are consistent with the objective of the Protocol. In the 
absence of domestic regulatory framework, Article 11 suggest as an option that developing 
countries ask exporters to provide a simplified risk assessment analysis before the first 
introduction, and decide whether or not to import it based on this assessment within a predictable 
timeframe, not to exceed 270 days. Many importing countries already have approval regulations 
for GM food, but if applied this article could extend the requirements for exporters of GM food 
to developing countries with no specific regulations. More importantly, under Article 18.2.a, 
parties to the BSP should request information from exporters regarding the presence and the 
identification of LMO-FFPs in any shipment before importation. At present, the BSP only 





that the shipment “may contain” LMO-FFPs. However, the definitive nature of the information 
requirements was not agreed, and a decision was expected in the Second Meeting of the Parties 
in Montreal, in June 2005.  
However, no agreement was reached on the specific implementation of Article 18.2.a. 
during the Second Meeting of the Parties (May 30 to June 3 2005 in Montreal, Canada), and the 
issue was reported to the next annual meeting of the Parties to be hold in Brazil in March 2006. 
In particular, BSP members could not agree on the degree of detail required to exporters and on 
the presence of a threshold level for the adventitious presence of GM crops without notification 
in non-GM shipments. 
Despite the divisions and conflicts, the negotiations resulted in the writing of a draft 
decision by the Swiss Chair of the so called Working Group 1, which gathered support by all 
members except Brazil and New-Zealand. Under this proposed draft rules, there are three main 
propositions on documentation requirements: 
1.  If a country exports a shipment of non-GM with the possible (but unknown) presence of 
several GM varieties, the exporter would have to state clearly that the shipment “may 
contain LMO-FFPs that have been approved in the Party of Import,” to provide the list 
of possible GM crops with unique identifiers for each GM event possibly present in the 
shipment, and to check that it actually has the authorization to export all possible 
varieties. 
2.  If a country exports an explicitly known GM shipment (mix or single GM crop), the 
exporter would have to declare that the shipment “Contains the following GM crops” and 
provide a detailed list with unique identifiers for each GM event present in the shipment, 
and to check that it actually has the authorization to export all possible varieties. 
3.  If a country exports a non-GM shipment, the exporter would not be required to mention 
anything as long as there is no GM content over the possible threshold level decided by 
the importer. 
Although the draft decision listed these three measures, the distinction between when to 





GM. It is more likely that BSP members will choose to apply either Option 1 or 2 to all 
shipments. For example, a second version of the draft decision was letting the importing country 
choose whether the exporter should be required to comply with Option 1 or Option 2 for any GM 
shipment. The main debate is whether the BSP should require Option 1 or Option 2 for all GM 
shipments, and whether there should be any mention of threshold level (Option 3). 
Despite the potential cost they would likely bear with III or IV, importers without 
domestic regulations on GM (African countries, led by Ethiopia) are strongly opposed to 
scenario I and in favor of III or IV.  
A recent study conducted for the International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council 
(Kalaitzandonakes 2004) showed that depending on the implementation rules, these regulations 
could impose a substantial cost on exporters and importers of the main GM and non-GM crops. 
Depending on the type of identification (may contain GMO, type of LMO, quantitative 
evaluation of each type of LMO), the report estimates annual testing cost between $1 and 87 
million per year for the U.S. and Argentina maize exporting industry, in countries where 
different types of GM and non-GM corn are commingled. Many other types of costs would be 
added to that. The report also argues that to enforce the agreement, the same level of expenses 
would be required for importers, and that developing countries would probably have to pay more 
to access the necessary technology and manage a team of expert measurement of LMOs. An 
earlier report done for the Canadian government (JRG Consulting Group 2004) estimates that 
information requirement costs for all crops would range between CAD 33 and 155 million per 
year (between $28 and 124 million per year) for Canada, depending on the necessity to test non-
GM traded crops (wheat and barley, adding CAD 67 million) and on Canada’s decision to ratify 






WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
Unlike the two other international bodies presented in this section, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) does not have any mandate on GM food regulations. The WTO’s role in the 
context of international trade and agriculture biotechnology is directly related to trade distorting 
regulations. There is no specific article of the WTO Agreement related to agricultural 
biotechnology; however the general rules of the trade agreement are in question when biosafety 
and marketing regulations potentially act as barriers to trade. Many WTO country members have 
adopted different domestic regulations on the approval and the marketing of GM food and in the 
absence of international consensus and standards, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO can 
act as an arbitrator to resolve trade disputes among members.
11 
Two WTO agreements are at the heart of the question of the legality of GM food 
regulations. First the Agreement on the Applications of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Agreement) provides rules related to safety regulations. Secondly, the Agreement on 
Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT Agreement) concerns domestic regulations that may be 
involved for other societal goals. In the case of GM food, the SPS agreement would rule in a 
dispute related to the validity of GM food safety regulations (including bans) based on unproved 
risks of GM food. The TBT agreement would rule if the importer raises technical standards or 
regulations (such as labeling) that are not directly related to safety or whose purpose is not 
related to safety, but that still may be trade distorting. 
The case of agricultural biotechnology presents new challenges to the application of the 
WTO trade agreement. First, the current WTO trade agreement does not provide a clear guidance 
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on the question of regulating products according to their process and production methods 
(Josling, Roberts, and Orden 2004).  Recent trade disputes have created precedents (Tuna-
Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle Disputes) but there is a general lack of agreement, especially in the 
case of standards for non-product related process and production methods (i.e., production 
attributes that cannot be verified in the product itself). At the same time, many national 
regulations covering GM foods are based on production process: for instance, they do not apply 
to any product produced with conventional agriculture methods, even if this product is exactly 
identical to a GM product. In other words, herbicide resistant crops, with the exact same property 
and characteristics as certain GM products, but obtained through conventional breeding methods 
(including induced mutagenesis) would not be subject to approval and marketing regulations in 
many countries. Moreover, a few countries (the EU, Brazil and China) require labeling of GM 
ingredients even in highly processed products where there is no available precise method to 
quantify transgenic DNA or proteins synthesized by novel DNA. This raises the issue of 
regulation enforcement: if all final products are virtually unidentifiable, it is impossible to ensure 
that they were produced with GM or non-GM ingredients. 
Secondly, the SPS agreement bases safety standards on a scientific assessment of existing 
risks, which goes against the strict application precautionary principle supported by the EU 
(based on the presence of unknown risks). The SPS Agreement has two main objectives: first to 
recognize the right of nations to set up their own domestic regulations with respect to health and 
second to ensure that these measures are not unnecessary barriers to trade. In particular, WTO 
members are not allowed to ban imports of products they consider risky for an extended period 
of time unless they are able to scientifically demonstrate the existence of significant risk or to 





other words, the SPS agreement allows countries to use precautionary measures but only during 
a provisional period, and provided they show effort of evaluating the risk of the products.
12 In the 
case of the Hormone-Beef WTO dispute, which was raised by the United States against a ban of 
beef by the EU on the basis of unknown risk associated with the consumption of beef raised with 
growth hormones, the WTO settlement body ruled against the EU, because the EU was unable to 
provide scientific evidence of the presence of risk to human health in a sufficiently time 
manner.
13  
Thirdly there is no clear rule for or against mandatory labeling, but rather open rules 
under the TBT agreement. The TBT Agreement includes two main clauses relevant to the case of 
mandatory labeling of GM food (Heumueller and Josling 2004). First, Article 2.1 restates the 
main principles of the GATT agreement with regard to national preference treatment and most 
favored nation treatment. Imported products “shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than 
that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other 
country.”  The main point of contention on this article relates to the definition of ‘like products,’ 
which could be based on end product differences (making GM food labeling a TBT illegal 
regulation only in some cases such as countries of Group 3) or on consumer preferences.  
Secondly, Article 2.2 of the TBT provides conditions under which a technical regulation is 
allowed for WTO members; it mainly requires two conditions: a broadly defined legitimate 
objective and the absence of any other less trade distorting measures that could achieve the same 
objectives. For the case of labeling requirements, the interpretation would depend on the 
legitimacy of a specific labeling requirement, on its importance and visual effects to achieve the 
                                                           
12 The question then becomes how long is ‘provisional’? Josling et al. (2004) mention the case of a forty-eight-year-
long regulation of Japan against U.S. exports, which the Dispute Settlement body ruled as too long to be considered 
‘provisional.’ 





objective as compared to other measures (such as educational programs or voluntary labeling for 
the objective of information provision). Heumueller and Josling (2004) argue that the TBT may 
rule for or against the labeling requirements, depending on the interpretation of this Agreement. 
WTO members have to notify new or changed SPS measures that may affect trade and 
that are not based on international recognized standards (Wolff 2001). At the end of April 2005, 
111 notifications related to genetically modified food or crops had been deposed at the SPS 
committee from twenty-two countries (the EU being counted as one country), as shown in Table 
4. Similarly, WTO members have to notify the TBT committee when they adopt new technical 





Table 4--Notification by WTO members of changes in regulations on genetically modified 
plants, food and organisms to the SPS and the TBT (01/1993 -04/2005) 
WTO member  SPS notifications (number)  TBT notifications (number) 
Argentina    GM plants and animals (2) 
Australia  Food, processed foods (11)  GM food, food derived from 
GM, processed foods (5) 
Brazil  Food products (1)  Packed food (1) 
Canada  Novel food, biotech, enzymes (9)  Novel food (1) 
Chile  Plant products (1)  Labeling GM food (1) 
China  GM food, plants, and labeling (7)   
Colombia Rice  (1)   
Czech Republic  Seeds (1)   
European Union  GM food and feed, products derived 
from GM food and feed (13) 
GM food, GM feed, labeling (15)
Germany   Foodstuffs  (1) 
Guatemala  GM organisms (1)   
Hong-Kong    GM food (1) 
Indonesia    GM food labeling (2) 
Japan  Food, feed and processed food (11)  GM food, labeling (5) 
South Korea  Food, feed, additives, labeling (7)  GM food, labeling (8) 
Malaysia  GM food (1)  GM food (2) 
Mexico  GM organisms (1)   
Netherlands    Non-GM food (1) 
New Zealand  Novel foods, GM organisms, food 
derived from GM (18) 
Food derived from GM,  
processed food (10) 
Norway  GM organisms (2)  GM organisms,  GM food  (3) 
Singapore  Plants and GM organisms (1)   
Slovenia  GM organisms  and plants (4)  GM organisms (2) 
South Africa  GM food labeling (1)  GM food labeling (1) 
Switzerland  Food and feedstuffs (3)  Food, feed, medicines (7) 
Sri Lanka  GM food (1)   
Thailand  GM food and plants (3)  Maize (1) 
USA  GM food, plants, and medicines (12)   






But by April 2005, only sixty-nine notifications had been made at the TBT committee by 
nineteen countries (the same caveat applies). The presence of labeling notification under both 
TBT and SPS agreements provide an evidence of the relative lack of clarity on the application of 
one or the other agreement on labeling. In addition, this table shows that forty-seven of the one 
hundred and forty-eight members of the WTO have adopted domestic regulations (counting 
twenty-five countries for the EU) on GM food based on their own standards.  
 In 1998, EU members decided to ban imports of new GM varieties for precautionary 
reasons, waiting to obtain data about the safety of these varieties. As a result the EU applied a de 
facto moratorium on any new GM varieties, thus blocking the entrance of GM corn from the 
United States for four years. In 2003, the United States, Argentina and Canada have filed a WTO 
dispute over the EU moratorium.  This dispute is important in the sense that it will provide a 
precedent regarding GM food and standards based on process and production methods. Bernauer 
(2005) argued that in view of both sides and WTO precedents with the SPS and TBT 
agreements, it is probable that the WTO would not rule completely against the EU moratorium, 
in part because they lift this measure in 2004, while replacing it with traceability and labeling 
regulations. But, at the same time, six EU countries decided to keep the moratorium in place. 
After delaying its decisions five times, the WTO panel sent a confidential settlement report to the 
four Parties on February 7 2006. According to the press, the Dispute Settlement Body ruled in 
favor of the complainants (Cage, 2006). But at the time of this paper’s publication, there was no 
detailed information about the complex decision outlined in the one-thousand-page-long report. 
It is likely that the EU will appeal to the decision, which would delay the final ruling until the 






In the current state of international agreements, the political view on GM food has 
remained polarized by the EU and the United States. At the international level, the harmonization 
effort is led by the two transatlantic powers through the Cartagena Protocol on one side–
supported by the EU–and the WTO dispute on the other, which was launched by the United 
States. In addition, both the United States and the EU are indirectly pushing for a change in rules 
in their favor, at the BSP and WTO SPS, respectively. Discussions at the Codex may balance the 
two powers, because the Codex is by nature a UN body that sets standards recognized by the 
WTO, but it is doubtful that it will generate a consensus in the short run.  
In the meantime, regional factors have pushed the globe towards local harmonization of 
labeling and approval procedures in Asia, Europe and North America. The three members of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have decided to agree on a common 
information scheme for transboundary movements of GM crops, on the basis of a “May Contain” 
GM and an informal 5 percent threshold level. European countries outside of the EU have 
progressively moved their import and labeling regulations toward EU standard in order to 
facilitate trade (Switzerland), or as a measure helping them make their case for accession to the 
EU (Croatia). In Asia, Thailand and Indonesia have adopted labeling regulations that are very 
similar to the ones of Japan.  
International institutions have made significant progress on approval and biosafety 
procedures. The Codex Commission published official recommendations for the approval of GM 
food, and the Cartagena Protocol provides recommendations for environmental regulations on 
GM crops as recognized by over one hundred countries. Yet on the question of marketing 





agreement; discussions have not advanced at the Codex Commission and the Cartagena Protocol 
does not clearly proposes specific requirements.  
In this context, three factors could affect the choice of regulations and technologies in 
developing countries. First, the final outcome of the WTO dispute will clearly send a signal to 
the rest of the world by setting a precedent. Bernauer (2005) argues that a clear ruling in favor or 
GM producing countries would set a signal that EU like policies will not be accepted in the 
WTO. On the other hand, a ruling in favor of (or not against) the EU policy would clearly show 
that countries have the right to have stringent regulations, and even ban those crops if they 
consider it necessary. Secondly, the United States Government has announced several times that 
it was also considering launching a WTO dispute against the new labeling and traceability 
regulations of the EU. A ruling on such a dispute would create a precedent on the question of the 
legality of mandatory labeling requirements based on production process and methods. Thirdly, 
if the BSP adopts stringent information requirements, large exporters of GM crops such as the 
United States, Canada and Argentina could dispute these requirements at the WTO, and create an 
international conflict between agreements.  
In this particular eventuality, the relevant question would be whether the BSP can act as a 
binding international agreement and thus be recognized as a reference in WTO rulings. If the 
Codex Commission was able to find a consensus on labeling, it could be recognized as a 
reference standard by the SPS agreement of the WTO. But would the BSP prevail in a WTO 
trade dispute? According to Cors (2000), under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
the latest agreement should rule. Unless a new statement is introduced in the SPS, the Biosafety 





recognize the BSP if all WTO members are also members of the BSP. Since this is not the case, 
there are two possibilities depending on the countries involved in the dispute: 
-  if both countries are WTO and BSP members, the BSP will rule;  
-  if one country is a non-party to the BSP and the other is a party to the BSP, the 
WTO and SPS agreement will rule, and will not recognize the BSP. 
 
Cors concludes that to avoid confrontation and to harmonize the SPS agreement of the 
WTO with the BSP, the easiest thing would be to include in the BSP a rule that would only allow 
temporary “provisional” use of precautionary measures for importers. But since this article, the 
BSP has been implemented and did not include such SPS type of measure. Other authors have 
argued that the BSP and the WTO are in conflict. Phillips and Kerr (2000) argue that the BSP is 
inconsistent with WTO rules because it allows trade restrictions based on process and production 
methods. More recently, Winham (2005) argues that the regime conflict between the WTO and 
the BSP over food safety and GMOs is singularly different than any other previous trade and 
environmental regime conflicts and could have very dramatic effects in the future. 
International organizations are setting up rules on information and risk related 
requirements for the products of agricultural biotechnology that will be determinant for 
developing countries. In particular, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety offers to use its 
mechanism as a default policy for all transition and developing countries without domestic 
regulations. Many countries in Africa and Asia have followed the BSP’s requirements. For 
developing countries members of the Protocol the question will then be the cost of 
implementation of a regulatory system consistent with the BSP (which should be partially funded 
by the Protocol) and the long run costs of implementation and enforcement.  In addition we 





upcoming decision on information requirements will play a crucial role in determining whether 
the BSP will incur a significant cost on country members and non-members and likely distort 





4.  MAJOR IMPORTERS REGULATIONS
14 
Apart from their international obligations, developing countries may be influenced by the 
choice of regulations of their international trade partners. In particular, exports of agricultural 
products can provide a substantial source of income for developing countries, and agriculture 
remain a sector were they may have a competitive advantage over developed countries. In recent 
years, several rich countries (particularly the European Union) importing large volumes of 
agricultural products have raised their food safety standards, and developing countries seeking to 
maintain their exports had to comply with these standards to maintain market access. Some of 
these new measures may be legitimately based on food safety risks but others may only be new 
types of non-tariff barriers. As in the case of GM food, large importers have raise significant 
standards requiring approval, labeling and traceability for consumer safety, but that could 
potentially be considered trade restrictive measures.  
In this section, we focus on two large importers with significant economic and political 
influence on the developing world: the European Union and Japan. GM food regulations in these 
two countries are representative of larger regions. In particular, most non-EU countries in Europe 
(e.g., the Eastern European nations) are adopting regulations similar to those in the EU. 
Switzerland is changing its threshold level to become compatible with EU standards. Similarly 
the Japanese labeling requirements may have influenced other Asian countries in their choice of 
GM labeling regulations. Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea have similar requirements to 
Japan’s; Vietnam and Malaysia are considering similar labeling policies.  
                                                           





THE EU’S REGULATIONS 
The EU regulatory approach is precautionary, process related, and includes mandatory 
labeling traceability requirements- it belongs to category 1. Requirements include food and feed 
crops, unprocessed or processed. Only non-food GM products (unseeded), such as textile or 
other industrial products are not subject to any requirement.  
The EU regulatory system for GM foods has become increasingly more stringent. In 
1990, the European Council adopted Directive 90/220 on the deliberate release of GM organisms 
into the environment. The directive regulated approval of GM crops for field trials and 
cultivation, and it also governed the approval of GM food. This first regulation did not define 
any specific approval procedures or labeling regulations. In 1997, the EU Parliament and the EU 
Council adopted Regulation 258/97, entitled the Novel Foods Regulation. This regulation 
applied to new food products including GM foods, and it defined approval procedures requiring 
proof that any GM food is safe for human consumption. Later, the EU commission and the 
Council published Regulations 1813/97 and 1139/98, which required the labeling of food 
products containing approved GM soybeans and GM corn. These regulations were augmented by 
Regulation 49/2000, introducing mandatory labeling of GM food and GM ingredients at the 1 
percent level and Regulation 50/2000, extending the labeling requirements to food ingredients 
containing GM additives and flavorings.  
The EU's most recent laws on GM food authorization (Regulation 1829/2003 and 
Regulation 1830/2003) took effect on April 18, 2004. These regulations established procedures 
for evaluating potential risks from GM food, and laid down rules on labeling of GM food and 
feed. Approvals are now granted for a period of 10 years, renewable. There is a 0 percent 
threshold for unapproved GM crops. Labeling is extended to animal feed, food sold by caterers, 





transgenic DNA or proteins. One major addition is the traceability requirements for GM and 
non-GM food: any food potentially containing GM material has to be tracked all the way from 
the farm to the consumer. This requires food companies to keep track of all shipments and to 
conduct DNA or protein tests at different stages. There is no labeling requirement for products 
such as meat, milk or eggs produced from animals fed with GM feed. The threshold for labeling 
is 0.9 percent.  
Under the new EU authorization system, as described in Commission Regulation 
641/2004 of April 6, 2004 (Figure 2), a company that intends to market a GM food product in the 
EU must follow four successive steps (Reuters).   
 
Figure 2--The EU authorization process in 2005 
 
 
First, the company must apply to the relevant authority of the EU member state where the 
product is first to be marketed, and provide a full risk assessment, a monitoring plan, a labeling 
proposal and a detection method. Second, if the authority gives a favorable opinion, the member 
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objections by other member states, the notifying state or its national food safety authority may 
authorize the product for marketing throughout the EU. Fourth, a decision is required at the EU 
level and the following procedure is initiated. The Commission asks the independent European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) for an opinion based on a risk assessment procedure. The EFSA 
must give an opinion within 6 months. If the opinion is favorable, the Commission submits a 
draft decision to the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, made up of 
scientific experts from the member states. If the committee approves the authorization, the 
Commission adopts the decision and authorizes the new GM food product. If the committee does 
not agree, the Commission sends its draft approval to the Council of Ministers (agricultural or 
environmental ministers), who has three months to reject or adopt it. If they do not act within this 
time, the Commission may adopt its own decision and authorize the new GM food product.   
Globally, the EU has the most comprehensive regulations on GM food. The new labeling 
and traceability regulation was introduced to force member states to end the de facto 4-year 
moratorium on new GM crops and to respond to the pressure imposed by the United States and 
other countries when they launched a WTO dispute on the moratorium. Since then, the EU has 
approved only three new GM varieties,
15 and it is now the labeling regulations that have become 
the new de facto trade barrier for targeted “food” products. Although labeling was introduced to 
provide consumer choice, the mandatory labeling system encouraged all food processors and 
retailers to avoid GM ingredients entirely.  
According to surveys and polls, a majority of EU consumers claim that they do not want 
to eat GM food, but at the same time some empirical studies (Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux 
2004;MORI 2002) have shown that a positive share of consumers would be willing to purchase 
GM products in the EU. Carter and Gruère (2003) argued that the EU mandatory labeling system 
                                                           





has acted as a majority voting system where the winner takes all.   Currently, it is almost 
impossible to find products derived from GM ingredients in the EU (Gruère forthcoming). GM 
animal feed is available because animal products are not required to be labeled. It is unlikely that 
the positions of the retailers and food processors will change, except if there is an abrupt shift in 
consumer acceptance (Knight, Mather, and Holdsworth 2005).  
 
JAPAN’S REGULATIONS 
Japan’s regulations include mandatory safety assessment and mandatory labeling based 
on differences in products and with a number of exemptions. Labeling is based on the end 
products, which means that highly processed products are exempt from labeling. Japan can be 
considered in category 3 of Figure 1  
In 2000, Japan introduced regulations defining the authorization procedure. The Ministry 
of Health Labor and Welfare (MHLW) is in charge of the approval procedure for GM food. All 
GM food, GM processing aids, and GM food additives are subject to pre-marketing safety 
assessment. The safety assessment includes information regarding the host, the vector, the 
inserted gene, the recombinants, and the toxicity levels. If the application to MHLW is complete, 
it is then submitted to the Expert Panel of the Biotechnology Subcommittee within the Food 
Sanitation Committee. The Panel reviews and makes recommendations to the Biotechnology 
Subcommittee, which then passes its judgment on to the Food Sanitation Committee. This 
committee makes a recommendation to MHLW’s minister, and if approved the new variety is 
announced in the Japanese Gazette. It usually takes about one year to go through the regulatory 
process.  
The MHLW enforces standards under the Food Sanitation Law (FSL), and it samples and 





not in Japan. There is a 0 percent tolerance for unapproved GM material. After the Starlink corn 
food scare, Japan increased the frequency of food safety inspections on corn from 5 to 50 percent 
of all cargoes. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (MAFF) is responsible for 
environmental safety approval, feed safety assessment and biotech labeling rules. The MAFF’s 
environmental assessment is voluntary but all companies comply. The MAFF’s feed safety 
assessment is mandatory, from April 1, 2003. All applications for feed approval are reviewed by 
the Feed Division of MAFF, and then sent to the Expert Committee of the Agricultural Materials 
Council. There is a 1 percent tolerance level for the unintentional presence of GM feed that has 
been approved in other countries, under the condition that the exporting country’s safety 
assessments are deemed equivalent to Japan’s. 
Japan’s mandatory labeling scheme was introduced on April 1, 2001 under the Law on 
Standardization and Proper Labeling of Agricultural and Forestry Products, which was 
introduced into the Japanese Agricultural Standards (JAS).  Labeling is required for all GM food 
if DNA/protein can be detected in the finished food products and if the GM ingredient is one of 
the top three ingredients and accounts for more than 5 percent of the total weight. This 5 percent 
tolerance level is informal but currently applied. The MAFF list of products subject to mandatory 
labeling included 30 foods in 2003. Importantly, there are no labeling requirements for soy oil or 
corn oil, except if the oil has special properties (such as high oleic soy oil). The labeling 
regulations are enforced jointly by MAFF and MHLW under the JAS and the FSL, respectively. 
In addition to the mandatory GM labeling requirements, there is a voluntary labeling option for 





Overall, the Japanese policy can be described as pragmatic, in the sense that it requires 
the labeling of GM food but the regulations do not cover all products and the tolerance levels are 
higher than in other countries. Food processors and retailers in Japan have typically avoided 
products with GM labels. As in the EU, most GM products are used for animal feed, but unlike 
in the EU, many highly processed products derived from GM ingredients (e.g., soy oil) are sold 
without labels.  
DISCUSSION: INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF THE EU AND JAPAN’S REGULATIONS 
Labeling and approval regulations in major trading countries have affected international 
trade in all GM crops except cotton (because most cotton products are not edible and thus not 
subject to food safety and labeling requirements). In particular, regulations in the EU and Japan–
two large importers of these crops– have impacted trade. Furthermore, the choice of regulations 
in the EU and Japan may have discouraged the development of new GM food varieties and at the 
same time encouraged third countries to adopt labeling requirements similar to those in the EU. 
The EU regulations managed to halt almost all corn imports during the de facto 
moratorium between 1998 and 2004. U.S. corn growers contend the ban has blocked around 
$300 million in annual sales of corn (King 2003). U.S. exports of corn byproducts to the EU also 
fell. But at the same time–even during the moratorium–the EU still imported a relatively large 
volume of GM soybeans for feed, mainly because meat from animals fed with GM crops is 
exempt from EU labeling requirements. Since the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) 
crisis, EU farmers are required to use only vegetable feed, and the EU is incapable of producing 
enough soybeans for its animals. Thus EU farmers import GM soybeans from Brazil, the United 





In the EU, food processors have switched to non-GM ingredients while farmers have 
been discouraged from adopting GM crops. For instance, Dewar et al. (2003) showed that the use 
of GM sugar beets would provide significant yield and environmental benefits but no EU farmer 
will adopt GM sugar beets because no sugar company would buy their product. Spain is the only 
EU country with significant GM crop production. In addition, Paarlberg (2002) argued that many 
developing countries have delayed or rejected crop biotechnology because of the stringent 
regulations of importers such as the EU.  
In contrast, Japanese regulations have not had a dramatic impact on imports of soybeans, 
corn, and canola because of pragmatic regulations and exemptions to the labeling requirements 
granted to soy and canola oil, and other processed products. Although there are no official data, 
up to 20 percent of Japan’s annual soybean imports (of 5 mmt) may be non-GM. The non-GM 
soybeans are mainly used for tofu, which unlike soybean oil, is subject to Japan’s GM labeling 
regulations. In addition, Japan imports non-GM corn each year from the U.S. and China. This 
corn is used in food products (such as snack foods) that are subject to the GM labeling rules. 
Most of Japan’s imported corn is GM, which is used for animal feed and the final meat product 
does not have to be labeled there. 
It is difficult to find GM labeled products at the retail level in Japan, but many products 
labeled as non-GM are available to consumers. The selective mandatory labeling regulations 
have acted as an intermediate set of rules–between voluntary labeling of non-GM (like in Canada 
or the United Stated) and a mandatory labeling of GM (like in the EU). In fact, a substantial 
amount of food eaten in Japan contains GM but it doesn’t have to be labeled. These products 







5.  EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS BY TYPE OF PRODUCT 
The previous three sections reviewed the most relevant current and future potential 
national and international trade related regulations of GM food. This exercise shows the 
complexity of trade related rules on GM food. National and international regulations share their 
objective and scope: regulate food safety risks and information on GM food (as defined in the 
introduction). But it appears that regulations differ significantly by country and institution. This 
section demonstrates that regulations also critically depend on the types of products.  
Table 5 provides a synthesis of international trade related regulations by type of GM 
product.   
Table 5--Trade related regulations by type of product 
Type of traded GM 
product  











EU, Japan, many 
others, Codex, BSP, 
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Currently, with low BSP information requirements, unprocessed food products face the 
most regulatory requirements then a subset of processed food products, unprocessed feed 
products, highly processed food products, and processed feed products.
16 Highly processed 
products derived from GM ingredients do not present detectable differences. These products 
could be ruled “like products,” in which case, discrimination based on GM non/GM would not 
be allowed under WTO rule.
17 The introduction of stringent BSP information rules would create 
a heavy burden on unprocessed food and feed compared to all other products, given that it would 
directly affect imports of agricultural commodities in one hundred and twenty countries.  
To assess the economic stakes of these regulations, we can match the regulatory burden 
with estimates of total trade value by type of product. Currently, based on approximate data on 
uses and trade of the four main GM crops,
18 simple calculations show (see Table 6) that 
unprocessed feed products represent the highest trade value at about $17 billion/yr, followed by 
processed feed products at $13 billion/yr, unprocessed food products estimated at $5.5 billion/yr, 
and processed food products at $3 billion/yr.   
                                                           
16 In addition, meat and animal products from animals fed with GM (as products derived from GM) can be 
considered products derived from GM crops.  
17 Highly processed GM products with no significant traces of transgenic DNA are excluded from SPS issues, and 
are not explicitly covered by TBT rules so long as they are considered like products. For a more complete discussion 
of standards based on non product related process and production method standards, see Josling et al. (2004). 
18 To our knowledge there is a lack of accurate data on the use of traded commodities, such as maize for feed. 
Instead, we obtained shares of feed in total world use (processed and raw) to derive the approximate estimates 





Table 6--Derived estimates of five-year average trade value by food and feed uses 
Total import 
value $ million 
Maize Soybeans Rapeseed Cottonseed  Total four crops 
Unprocessed food  2,682 2,476  346  32  5,536 
Processed food  348 1,925  518  25  2,816 
Unprocessed feed  6,456 9,353  1,298  149  17,256 
Processed feed  839 10,531  1,204  81  12,655 
Source: Author’s derivations, using FAOSTAT for uses and UN Comtrader trade data. Note: other uses can be 
derived as the residual difference between estimates of Table 3 and Table 6. 
 
Thus, under current regulations, and for current GM crops, products with the highest 
traded value (feed) are not subject to the most stringent requirements. In addition, as mentioned 
in Section 4, the fact that meat and animal products are excluded from labeling requirements in 
many countries including the EU make animal feed relatively untouched by labeling regulations.  
This may be due to exogenous and endogenous factors. Current GM crops were the first 
developed arguably because they represent a higher total economic value (Charles 2001), and 
that the improvement with agricultural biotechnology was expected to have a significant impact 
on productivity, not because they are mainly used for feed. Furthermore, unprocessed products 
containing seeds are the focus of environmental regulations because of their potential use for 
planting. On the other hand, the focus of stringent regulations may have been decided selectively 
because of endogenous economic reasons. Processed food is excluded from labeling in many 
countries; meat fed with GM is not subject to labeling in the EU most probably because of the 
economic stake of avoiding GM soybeans for animal feed.   
But if major transgenic “food” crops were adopted in the near future, such as wheat or 
rice, they would likely be subject to a very comprehensive set of regulations. In other words, it is 
clear that the current GM crops will not be affected as much as large sets of potential future GM 






6.  EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS ON DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES’ POLICYMAKING 
In this final section, we relate our findings on international regulations to the question of 
determining the best regulations of GM food for developing countries. First, we discuss the 
effects of regulations derived from international agreements on developing countries policy 
making. Secondly, we identify two types of spillover effects of importers’ regulations through 
international trade linkages. Thirdly, based on these political constraints, we analyze potential 
policy solutions for developing countries to address simultaneously multiple economic 
objectives.  
 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES   
The most direct effect of international regulations on developing countries comes from 
the application of the relevant international agreements (presented in Section 3). Developing 
countries that are not member of any of these agreements can be affected by international 
regulations because of international trade linkages. But the more numerous developing countries 
that are members of the UN Codex Alimentarius, the BSP or the WTO have the right to 
participate to the design of new rules within these agreements. So theoretically, most developing 
countries should be actively contributing to the design and implementation of international 
agreements. But the question becomes whether or not they actually participate and influence the 
design of international rules to their own benefit. Three factors may affect their participation: 
first, their capacity to do so, secondly their willingness to do so, and thirdly the institutional rules 





In terms of capacity, even if the United Nations and the WTO offer the possibility for any 
member country to actively take part into the decision making process, it remains questionable 
whether all developing countries are actually able to affect international decision making as 
much as developed countries. First, their personal participation (in terms of representative body) 
may be limited due to restricted public funding. Second, even if they have a full participating 
body, they may not have sufficient information because they lack a support body reporting ex 
ante analysis of potential decisions, which most developed countries have.  
Reports from recent conflicts on information requirements at the BSP, and on labeling 
requirements at the Codex Commission, show that at least a few developing countries from East 
Africa (Ethiopia and Kenya) actively participated in the process of policy making. So even if 
many developing countries may be standing behind others, UN arenas seem to provide a room 
for discussions and arguments for developing countries. At the same time, it is not sure that 
every country following the majority in these fora –in favor of strict information requirements at 
the BSP and mandatory labeling for all GM food at the Codex- is fully informed about the 
economic consequences of such measures.  
Secondly, even if they are fully informed, and if they have the capacity to influence 
decisions, developing countries are not forced to take position and support their own cause, i.e., 
their representation also comes from their willingness to participate. Countries that represent 
major international economic powers can use their influence to encourage developing countries 
to support their positions or at least to discourage them to publicly oppose their positions.  
Diplomatic efforts to obtain political support in exchange of other type of political support,
19 
preferential or future bilateral trade agreements, development aid, or economic and financial ties 
can play a role. In addition, developing countries may decide to stand behind other countries for 
                                                           





strategic purposes without any explicit or implicit deal- for example in order to gain future 
political credit. Because these interactions usually remain secret, there is no clear evidence of 
these political games for agricultural biotechnology. Yet, several authors have argued that the 
EU and the United States have used their political influence to support their position since the 
beginning of their political opposition on biotechnology (Bernauer 2003; Miller and Conko 
2004; Isaac 2002).  
Thirdly, the rules of the game may play a role, pushing for a specific representation of 
national actors in international forums. In the case of agricultural biotechnology, in many 
countries the agricultural and food ministry, the environment ministry, and often the science and 
technology ministry play conflicting roles in regulatory design and implementation. This has 
both advantages and inconveniences, it may help adopt a balanced view of risks and 
opportunities of agricultural biotechnology, but it can also end up creating a conflicting two- or 
three-headed representation of power practically blocking the implementation of biosafety and 
biotechnology regulations. This conflict is translated at the international level, where BSP 
participants are only environmental ministries, WTO participants may include agricultural and 
trade ministries, and Codex Alimentarius participating members may include agricultural and 
food or consumer protection government agencies. As a main observable consequence, trade 
related measures at the BSP are discussed in the context of environmental risks. Thus, many 
developing countries’ environmental ministers, whose mandate is to limit risks with the help of 
the international community, consider information requirements as necessary measures for the 
environment. Trade or agricultural consequences of strict information requirements may totally 





Thus, many factors can contribute to creating a significant difference between regulations 
decided in international forums and the needs and ideal regulatory system for individual 
developing countries.  As a consequence, international regulations appear as an exogenous 
constraint for many developing countries, affecting their decisions on regulation and adoption of 
agricultural biotechnology.  We do not argue that international agreements are not beneficial for 
these countries overall or even in the area of agricultural biotechnology, because in many cases 
they do benefit from these regulations.  Instead, we argue that international regulations are 
influential on most developing countries’ decisions, and because of imperfect participation or 
representation, may force them to decisions that are not necessarily optimal.  
More specifically, the Codex and the Biosafety Protocol do not have the same potential 
effects. On the one hand, guidelines approved at the Codex Alimentarius do not provide 
mandatory requirements for developing countries; instead they allow any country to comply with 
such guidelines while being in compliance with the WTO SPS agreement. Thus, Codex 
guidelines for comprehensive labeling requirements of GM food would allow any developing 
country that is a WTO member to have its own mandatory labeling regulation while staying in 
compliance with the WTO. At the same time, such measure would potentially encourage other 
countries, including current and future food importers (WTO or non-WTO members) to adopt 
mandatory labeling policies. Currently, the majority of Codex members, including a very large 
number of developing countries officially support the inclusion of comprehensive labeling for 
GM food in the Codex Alimentarius. Their position is consistent with large importers that are not 
producing GM crops like the EU or Japan and not consistent with countries that are willing to 





On the other hand, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is providing rules that become 
binding for all members. All developing countries will apply rules that are part of the Protocol. 
The current overwhelming support among poor and very poor countries for strict information 
requirements at the Protocol may reflect environmental interests, but may also reflect the fact 
that many of these countries are either not regarding GM crops as a potential technology for 
production, imports or export or not considering the cost it will impose on future exports 
particularly if they do adopt GM crops.  
SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF IMPORTERS REGULATION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
In addition of the influence of international agreements, we have identified two main 
spillover effects of national regulations of large importers on developing countries. 
 
The export effect 
Many developing countries have been discouraged of investment/ adoption of crops for 
fear of incurring large fixed costs (approval) and variable costs (traceability, segregation, 
labeling) for present and future exports of GM or non-GM crops. However, recent studies have 
argued that policy makers may actually overvalue this export loss. For example Anderson and 
Jackson (2004) show that under current crop production, the adoption of GM crops by various 
developing countries may not result in any serious losses offsetting the potential productivity 
gains of these crops. Paarlberg (2005) shows that under current trade conditions, African exports 
of crops that could be GM to the EU only represents a low share (4 to 10 percent) of total exports 
in these crops and a very low trade value compared to the overall benefits of using such 





export loss effect has likely been excessive in view of the actual trade flows of most of the crop 
concerns and the limited potential of the target export markets in the future.
20  
In addition this fear is driven by the assumption that any segregation of GM and non-GM 
is infeasible. For example, several African countries have banned production or imports of GM 
crops or food derived from GM crops for fear that their introduction would make the whole 
production potentially GM from the perspective of current or future importers located in 
countries with stringent regulations and low thresholds of contamination (Paarlberg 2005). By 
adopting this reasoning, these African policy makers assumed implicitly that coexistence and 
segregation are infeasible or could only be achieved at a prohibitive cost. Yet, Brazil’s 
experience with soybeans suggests that this is not necessarily the case in all developing 
countries; it may be possible to have producers of GM crops and producers of non-GM crops 
exporting to rich importers in the same country. Furthermore, Knight et al. (2005) reports that 
large food importers in the EU do not pay attention to the adoption of other GM crops when 
importing agricultural products from a particular country. 
 
The regulatory harmonization effect  
To facilitate trade, adopting the same standards as the country of exports can be costly 
but could supposedly help to keep market access. This may be the case for policies that are not 
market distorting, such as approval and biosafety field regulations. Adopting internationally 
recognized or mutually recognized standards or importers’ standard can help reduce the cost of 
application and approval to access a given market. For example, the Philippines use similar types 
of standards as the U.S. standards for safety approval and thus do not reject imports from U.S 
maize or soybeans after reviewing the safety applications. So far the United States has not been 
                                                           
20 Of course, this depends on the producing country and the particular products, and should be evaluated on a case-





importing GM food, being large exporters of all GM crops, but mutual recognition would imply 
that the United States also recognizes the validity of the approval standards used by the 
Philippines or by any other countries with similar standards.  
However, the case of mandatory labeling is much more complex. In view of current 
regulations, adopting mandatory labeling regulations that are similar to the main importers likely 
reduces the domestic consumption of GM, the production of GM, raises costs for non-GM that 
are intended for domestic use, for the sake of exports to specific countries with stringent 
regulations. In contrast, voluntary labeling and certification with segregation could provide 
access to the countries with non-GM premium such as Japan or the EU, as organic products, fair 
trade and eco-labeled products already do, while letting the non exporters decide which 
technology to use. These voluntary mechanisms let market demand drive the production and 
adoption of approved GM crops and may result in a proportion of adoption that reflects more 
directly consumer demand. 
IDENTIFYING POLICY SOLUTIONS TO SATISFY DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
OBJECTIVES 
We just showed that international agreement and domestic regulations of large importers 
affect policy decisions on adoption of GM crops and regulatory decisions in developing 
countries. This influence is translated in two ways, first as an external constraint to political 
decision making because of compliance to requirements, and second through a shift in the 
objectives of policymakers, e.g., to assure market access in large importing countries. We will 
now take a step back by considering how policy making in developing countries can respond to 
these two types of influence, by analyzing what policies can help these countries achieve 





Policy makers should be able to consider a wide set of objectives when deciding whether 
to adopt selected GM crops or to introduce any type of biosafety or marketing regulation. We use 
a Venn diagram to represent a possible set of four policy objectives for a typical developing 
country in Figure 3.  We assume that most countries try to 1) maintain or increase their market 
access to all importing countries, including those with stringent regulations on GM food, 2) find 
solutions to increase agricultural productivity, including the use of beneficial GM crops, 3) 
maintain low consumer price and sufficient food availability for consumers, and 4) manage 
biosafety risks (food safety and environmental) related to GM crop technology, while satisfying 
their international obligations. The ideal set of regulation should be able to satisfy 
simultaneously all objectives together, as least to a certain extent.  
Currently, most developing countries seem to be focusing their effort on one, two or three 
of these objectives without including the remaining one or two or without completely satisfying 
their international obligations (see Section 2). At the same time (see Section 3 and 6), 
international agreements provide a regulatory framework limited to some of these objectives. 
The WTO is concerned with export and imports, and try to maintain countries into a state that 
allow them to plainly benefit from trade (i.e., maintain countries within the set defined by zones 
4, d, c, or optimum). The Codex Alimentarius provides recommendations that facilitate trade and 
limit food safety risks (i.e., encourage countries to stay within the set defined by zone 1, a, d, and 
optimum). Proactive international regulations tend to move countries away from the optimum 
(see Section 6). The BSP officially provides biosafety regulations to limit environmental risks 
related to the production of GM crops, (i.e., encouraging countries to stay within the set defined 
by zone 2, a, b, and optimum). But at the same time, we have argued that current and pending 





transgenic crops. Large importer’s regulations affect the realization of export related objectives 
for developing countries, which is translated into approval strategies and policies in many 
countries (such as GM moratorium or rejection of any GM food crop) that may impede on the 
realization of production objectives (see Sections 4 and 6). In other words they arguably push 
countries horizontally to the left.  
We will now consider the case of each zone in the figure to identify policy options that 
may help move towards the target or optimum. The four numbered zones in Figure 3 represent 
areas where countries have achieved two of the four objectives. 
Figure 3--Combining developing countries policy objectives for decision making on the 
adoption of production technologies and regulations of GM food 
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•  Zone 1: Countries in this zone have adopted national and international biosafety 
regulations, potential import restrictions or bans of GM food without adopting any GM 





•  Zone 2: These countries have adopted national and international biosafety regulations, 
including potential import restrictions, but have also started to adopt successful GM crops 
without segregation or without mechanism to export these crops to importers of non-GM. 
For example, Bt maize was introduced in Spain or Eastern Europe before the application 
of any coexistence rule, because these crops are approved for animal feed, and not used 
for exports. 
•  Zone 3:  These countries have adopted GM crops without segregation, labeling, or import 
restrictions and with limited biosafety regulations for GM crops. No countries got into 
this position on purpose, but because of illegal transboundary seed movements happening 
before the setting up of biosafety rules, Brazil, India and a few other countries have been 
in this position at least temporarily in recent years. 
•  Zone 4:  These countries have not adopted any GM crops, but import certain GM food 
without specific approval regulation. Several African countries are in this case. 
The four zones defined by letters in Figure 3 represent areas where countries may have 
achieved three objectives out of four: 
•  Zone a:  These countries have introduced biosafety regulations for GM crops and GM 
food, stringent labeling and import approval regulations, produce certain GM crops with 
few export restrictions (such as cotton) or are able to segregate non-GM from GM crops 
for exportable commodities. Example: Brazil, China. 
•  Zone b: These countries have adopted safety regulations, produce approve GM crops, and 
consume GM food without specific stringent marketing regulations on substantially 
equivalent products, but do not have any segregation scheme, such as the Philippines. 
•  Zone c: Countries in this zone would have adopted GM crops with loose biosafety 
regulations, while producing only exportable GM crops (cotton or approved soybeans) or 
being able to achieve segregation for exported non-GM crops. To our knowledge no 





•  Zone d: These countries have introduced comprehensive biosafety regulations, but did 
not approve GM crops or only approved GM cotton, and do not restrict imports of GM 
food or have limited consumer regulations, such as India, Indonesia, Bangladesh.  
 
Based on this preliminary analysis, we identify four necessary conditions to achieve the 
defined optimum:  
1.  Adopt a comprehensive but practical approval biosafety regulatory process for 
GM crop production and GM food for consumption based on international 
standards; 
2.  Adopt approved GM crops adapted to regional constraints and preferences that 
offer significant productivity increases; 
3.  Import and consume approved GM food without further potential trade or costly 
restrictions (e.g., no stringent mandatory labeling or stringent information 
requirements, but possible voluntary labeling to let consumer choose and 
certification for exports) 
4.  Adopt policies and strategies that help segregate GM and non-GM crops for 
exportable markets and potentially for the domestic market (non-GM niche). 
 
In addition, each country needs to respond to its international obligations, which depend 
on its membership to the WTO and to the BSP. Membership to the WTO does not prevent using 
these four policy options, whereas the BSP may already prevent countries from achieving 
consumption and production objectives, especially if stringent information requirements 
mechanisms are introduced. If these requirements were introduced, it would be much more 
costly to reach the defined optimum. 
Practically, the implementation of these four policy conditions still needs to be defined 





safety approval (condition 1), following the example of the EU and Japan (see section 4) would 
require not only testing for each new import approval but also implementing tests for all 
incoming traded shipment, which would be highly costly for developing countries. Very low 
threshold of adventitious presence risks making the regulation unenforceable.  In contrast, the 
Philippines use standards of approval that are similar to North American ones, and receive the 
application files from private company for each new transgenic corn in the U.S. that will 
potentially be imported there. The ideal policy will gain from standardized efforts on new GM 
crops, such as the use of Codex standards, and pragmatic testing depending on the crop.   
Secondly, the adoption of GM crops (condition 2) depends on an efficient system of 
biosafety regulations, which model we will not discuss in detail in this paper. It is clear that GM 
crops (crop/trait combinations, not necessarily varieties) have to be evaluated on the case by case 
basis. Research prioritization should help the public sector to direct their effort towards poverty 
reducing technology and complement private companies’ innovation efforts.  
The third condition is less costly to implement than mandatory labeling or strict 
information requirements. In many countries, the demand for non-GM food and for labeling 
requirements arguably seems to be politically supported by clear opponents to the technology. 
The economic effects of mandatory versus voluntary labeling will greatly depend on 1) the 
purchasing power and sensitivity of consumers and 2) the structure and organization of the food 
chain. Many developing countries have large populations of poor consumers (some of them 
illiterate), low standards of safety, rare food labels, and unstructured industry, where mandatory 
labeling would likely be very costly, and unenforceable. As mentioned in Section 6. (the 
regulatory harmonization effect), there is no evidence that the adoption of stringent mandatory 





domestic decision based on domestic objectives (comparing the cost of implementation to the 
benefits of consumer information and consumer choice is likely to help achieve these targets).   
Finally the fourth condition, which is related to segregation may require significant 
public investments, but may not be infeasible in many countries given the existence of a real 
premium for non-GM in the domestic or international market, and the investment of vertically 
integrated companies into non-GM market chains. Segregation could be implemented without 
much public investment, as part of traceability initiatives in international private sector supply 
chain (particularly for export), as was the case in Brazil for soybeans (or to a certain extent in the 
United States for soybeans). In many Asian countries, certification and segregation is already 
occurring for export markets, for example in the case of organic varieties. Besides, our analysis 
by type of products shows that the effects of regulations depend on the type of product, so that 
the adoption of non-food and feed GM products would not affect significantly exports in the long 
run even without segregation. So in the short run, it is clear that certain GM crops will be less 
risky and less costly to introduce.  
We have argued through several examples in this paper (GM wheat, sugarbeet, maize) 
that because of stringent regulations certain food crops were not introduced because of market 
rejections (see section 1 and 4). But this should not be generalized, particularly for the case of 
developing countries: all crops grown in developing countries are not (and nor will they likely 
be) exported to particularly sensitive markets, all products are not affected by import regulations 
(see section 5), and all potential loss in particular markets should be compared to the net 
productivity and welfare gains for producers and consumers domestically. These examples 
reflect cases of developed producing countries where large shares of market revenues were at 





where the productivity gains with the technology were not dramatic compared to the potential 
market losses.  Developing countries, who in many cases, do not export a very large share of 
production to sensitive countries, could greatly improve productivity with particular transgenic 
crops would benefit from segregation schemes allowing them to keep market access for non-GM 
exports while adopting GM crops destined for other less sensitive countries and for domestic 
consumption. 
The proposed set of policy solutions balance the need for complete and effective 
regulations for biosafety approval and segregation, with a more relax and less costly consensus 
based on private initiatives for measures related to consumer information and adoption of GM 
crops. This set of regulations should allow developing countries to address safety and economic 
risks, while making the room for adoption of beneficial crops for the benefit of poor producers 
and consumers.     
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyzed international trade related regulations on the food and feed 
products derived from transgenic crops, generically called genetically modified (GM) food. We 
focused on product regulations as opposed to crop or plant regulations, reviewed regulations of 
large importers, defined by international agreement, and analyzed their effects on international 
agricultural trade. Based on this review, we then identified their effects on developing countries’ 
decision making, and suggested policy solutions to maximize multiple domestic objectives under 
these regulatory constraints.  
There is a large heterogeneity in regulations of GM food among countries. Developing 





also on their international obligations and on their international trade partners’ own regulations. 
While internationally harmonized safety approval regulations have been finalized, there is no 
consensus on labeling and marketing regulations for GM food. We reviewed the regulations of 
two large importers, Japan and the European Union, and showed that the Japanese regulation is 
more pragmatic and less trade distorting than the EU’s one. We argued that these two regulations 
tend to affect other countries’ choice of regulations. In particular, we identified two spillover 
effects of importers’ regulations on developing countries choice of production and regulations: 
the fear of export loss, linked with the belief that segregation is infeasible, and the regulatory 
harmonization effect, linking domestic policy choice to market access. 
We also showed that the effects of trade related regulations depend critically on the type 
of products they target: unprocessed and processed food products tend to bear more requirements 
than other types of products. At the same time, without stringent information requirements at the 
BSP, the most traded products are unprocessed feed products. Thus, the likely economic cost of 
regulations is less for current crop than what it will be for future GM “food” crops mostly traded 
unprocessed, and the introduction of the BSP would have a significant impact both on current 
(mostly unprocessed feed) and future GM products (mostly unprocessed food).  
We then suggested four policy arrangements to enable developing countries to 
simultaneously satisfy production, consumption, international trade and risk management 
objectives simultaneously, based on two critical measures: the practical and efficient use of 
harmonized safety standards for imports and the setting up of segregation strategies of GM 
versus non-GM for sensitive export commodities and to respond to domestic or international 
consumer demand. Based on our review, we showed that these proposed policies may help 





benefit from productivity enhancing technology. At the same time, we raised the issue that the 
Biosafety Protocol, by entering into commodity trade regulations through suggested strict 
information requirements may prevent these countries from achieving consumption and 
production related objectives.  
Finally, we acknowledge that quantitative studies are needed to assess the effects of 
international regulations on developing countries and to evaluate the benefits of adopting specific 
trade related regulations of GM food in developing countries. We plan to address these issues in 
the near future. We have initiated country case studies in South and South-East Asia to evaluate 
the effects of international regulations and simulate the effects of policies on the benefits of 
adopting future GM crops. In parallel, we have also started an economic analysis on the effects 
of strict information requirements on international agricultural trade and in developing countries 
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